Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.
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Perhaps the most widely accepted view along these lines is that self-knowledge, even if not absolutely certain, is especially secure, in the following sense: The differences between these are subtle. His argument that such thinkers must be capable of self-knowledge rests on his objections to perceptual models of introspection, outlined in 3. Suki Bapswent is currently reading it Nov 17, Williamson has argued against a particular, seemingly plausible thesis regarding self-knowledge: Given that sensations are usually regarded as especially accessible, the fact that one is not always in a position knolwedge know whether one is experiencing a given sensation suggests that one is not always in a position to know whether one is in any given mental state.
Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler.
Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler (ebook)
Self-knowledge is especially secure, epistemically. These agentialist accounts will be discussed in subsection 3. VirtuesMalden, MA: Strictly speaking, then, this position is not concerned with self- knowledge.
On Two Dogmas of Epistemology. Beliefs qualify as knowledge by virtue of some feature not directly accessible to the thinking subject, knowleedge as the fact that they appropriately result from the exercise of a reliable inner sense or mindreading mechanism.
It is thus self-verifying, and hence may constitute knowledge on the basis of nothing beyond that thought Burge delf No easy argument renders this statement self-verifying. That self-attribution is then an avowal: He denies that my happiness constitutes epistemic justification for my avowal; in fact, he denies that avowals are the sort of things that are justified.
Here is a simple counter-example to the claim of infallibility. The first-person authority view does not require that self-attributions be epistemically grounded. Those who reject that idea will maintain that the ISA account reverses the proper explanatory order, since our basic conception of mental states derives not from theory but from our awareness of such states in ourselves, achieved by use of an exclusively first-personal faculty geryler introspection.
Robert rated it liked it Nov 07, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 1: Richiereadsbooks marked it as to-read Feb 18, When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. The monitoring mechanism involved in inner sense must form representations of the mental states it takes as input. Goodreads briee you keep track of books you want to read.
And subjective justification for a belief must be available to the thinker, and recognizable as her subjective justification. To answer this objection, acquaintance theorists will concede that we can be wrong about our own phenomenal states.
Brie Gertler, Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism – PhilArchive
Jack Davis is currently reading it Oct 13, Coliva objects that judgments cannot rationalize self-attributions of belief in the way the reasons theorist contends, because they are not suitably accessible. These may be clearly perceived provided we take great care in our judgments concerning them to include no more than what gretler strictly contained in our perception—no more than that of which we have inner awareness.
This self-conception is also gegtler conception of oneself as rationalas a thing that believes and intends etc. Some philosophers take attitudes to be relational in another way as well, namely that attitude contents depend on relations to the environment: And anyone in a position to self-attribute a belief will possess the concept of belief, and so will grasp—or at least, manifest cognitive dispositions appropriately reflecting—these conceptual truths.
The authors collect introspective reports from a single individual, who carries a beeper that sounds at random moments; when it sounds, she is to note what she is currently thinking and feeling. The first is exegetical: And this suggests that, necessarily, rational subjects are generally aware of their beliefs. A relevant contrast here is with the reasons account.
A possible drawback of agentialism is its limited application. Terms in square brackets are mine. But for Bar-On, unlike Finkelstein, explaining first-person authority is a separate project from explaining the epistemic dimension of self-knowledge.